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Abstract 
The hallmark of the Singapore `success story’, state-led, market-driven interventions and their 
efficacy have often been a matter of academic contention. This paper, as part of our series on this 
topic, revisits Singapore’s state-enterprise strategy in the context of the city-state’s determined 
efforts at internationalization, in order to present an objective view on the purported 
transferability of this strategy in the framework of Regionalization21, a series of transborder 
industrialization experiments in Indonesia, Vietnam and China. These state-engineered projects, 
orchestrated to encapsulate economic space for Singapore-based firms to expand into the region, 
remain controversial; premised, as they are, on the exportability of Singapore’s state credibility, 
systemic and operational efficiencies as well as technological competencies, to locations where 
these attributes are less distinct. To shed some light on this controversy, we present the latest 
evidence culled from surveys and interviews conducted in the Singapore-styled industrial-
townships in these three countries. Our results show that the strategic advantage created in the 
industrial enclave in Indonesia remains uncertain; that the performance of the enclave in 
Vietnam is stable, if unspectacular; whilst the ‘experiment’ in China is arguably a measured 
success, now that vested interests are aligned. At the same time, however, additional 
complications relating to individual socio-political environments continue to plague the parks, 
even as they adapt to impending economic challenges. 
 
Key words: Internationalization; State Enterprise Networks; Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
 
 
Introduction 
With a history of having risen from post-colonial uncertainty to be an important base for 
multinational manufacturing in the region, Singapore has been previously described as the most 
successful economy among the four East Asian dragons by Giordano and Kato (1993).  While 
said description has been rendered somewhat irrelevant in recent years, it remains an accepted 
truth that the Singapore government has laid a foundation for a corruption-free administration 
throughout the years; this, coupled with infrastructural efficiency and the overall integrity of its 
legal and financial systems, has played a central role in attracting foreign direct investments to 
fuel the city-state’s economic development (Mirza 1986; Pang, 1987; Rodan 1989; Huff 1995). 
Of particular interest to certain quarters was the state-led, market-driven intervention which 
underscored the city-state’s development strategies (Krause 1998; Low 1998; Blomqvist 2001). 
However, in time, rising domestic business costs on top of the growing competition from 
emerging economies in the region rendered it an imperative for Singapore’s economic planners 
to re-examine and expand the city-state's investment horizons (Wong and Ng 1991; Regnier 
1993). The Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB) positioned the city-state’s 
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internationalization strategy in a policy paper, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global 
Economy (SEDB 1988). The 1990 Global Strategies Conference and the 1993 Regionalization 
Forum added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB 1990; 1993a), while the policy 
documents, Singapore Unlimited and Regionalization 2000, encapsulated the stratagem for 
Singapore’s participation in the dynamic growth of regional economies like Indonesia, Vietnam 
and China (SEDB, 1995a, 1995b; Pang 1995; Okposin 1999). 
The Singapore government’s role as a facilitator and partner is evident from the creation of 
familiar and friendly Singapore-havens via industrial parks in neighboring countries and the 
restructuring of tax policies (Singapore Ministry of Finance 1993; SEDB 1993b).  The state also 
embarked on fostering trusted regional networks identical to those within its domestic market, 
whereby interlocking interests and a perceived commonality of values were to crystallize a 
system of cooperative competition. Implicit in this stratagem was the government’s intent to 
draw on its state enterprise network (or, in local parlance, Singapore Inc.), and extend this 
network to facilitate business ventures in the region (Yeung 1998; Zutshi and Gibbons 1998; 
Pereira 2000). This strategy to remain economically competitive in the global economy has been 
characterized by the building of platforms for national growth through the management of 
strategic alliances and ‘collaborations’ with private or semi-private enterprises on national 
economic projects. Theoretically, the ‘vested interests’ within the interlinked collaborative 
system were to serve to expedite processes, garner exclusive incentives, and negate inept 
bureaucracy; like parts in an intricate and complex machine (Yeoh et al 2004a).   
This industrial regionalization strategy itself is a synergy of state intervention policies.  
Political leaders, in the initial phase, negotiate the projects’ institutional framework that typically 
involves the garnering of special investment conditions in the host locations.  They also secure 
endorsements from host-country governments to provide political patronage and protection to the 
projects, which are critical for attracting potential investors.  Following which, government-led 
consortia, typically comprising of Singapore government agencies and government-linked 
companies (GLCs), take on the role of primary investors in the parks’ development; justified by 
the perceived reluctance of firms in the private-sector to take on investments of such gargantuan 
scale, given the large amount of time before any realization of investment would materialize. 
Moreover, the high risks involved in venturing into a relatively undeveloped and unfamiliar 
locale renders such inherently unattractive to private enterprises, due to the uncertain political 
climate and investors’ interests.  In the later stages, government agencies actively market these 
projects to Singapore-based multinational enterprises (MNEs), on top of the internationalization 
of Singapore companies. The presence of government agencies and government-linked 
companies, as ‘business architects’ and ‘knowledge arbitrageurs’, adds weight to these 
promotional efforts.  
This paper, in a continuation of our empirical series on Singapore’s regionalization 
initiatives, hence focuses on the created variables of this selective intervention, as well as the 
attractions posed by the park’s partners to investors.  We aim to test if these variables were 
similarly perceived as such by the resultant investors in the parks, and also how they measure up 
to the realities of the host business environments.  In the following section, we outline the 
theoretical considerations that underscore Singapore’s regionalization strategy.  This is followed 
by an overview and explanation of the political and historical backgrounds of the case-study 
parks. Thereafter, we detail the methodology of our field research, and present our findings and 
the preliminary inferences we draw from them; and then, with reference to the empirical 
findings, we discuss the issues and challenges the parks face, and finally conclude that, while the 
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parks have achieved some limited success, they have been, and continue to be, prone to 
complications radiating from the socio-political dimension. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
Dunning’s (1980, 1988) eclectic paradigm sought to provide the analytical basis for explaining 
the activities of firms situated beyond their national boundaries. The OLI paradigm was used to 
explain the ability and willingness of firms to serve markets, and examine the reasons for their 
choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign production rather than domestic production, 
exports or portfolio resource flows through the interaction of Ownership-specific (O) advantages, 
Location-specific (L) advantages, and Internalization-incentive (I) advantages. The paradigm 
was reconfigured to constitute the ‘asset-augmenting’ aspects of FDI and MNC activity. For 
instance, O-advantages have been separated into static and dynamic - static advantages 
describing the advantages possessed by a firm that generate income at a particular point of time 
and dynamic advantages illustrating the proprietary factors which permit a firm to boost its 
incoming-generating assets over time. 
Dunning (1998), Porter (2000), and others (surveyed in Jovanovic 2003), have further 
reiterated the importance of the spatial dimension, such as location-advantages as affecting the 
competitiveness of investing firms. The strategic choice of firms’ locations reflects twin aims - to 
not only transfer their resources to the host countries, but also to gain access to the available 
strategic assets (Makino and Delios 1996). Like O-advantages, L-advantages can also be 
classified as static and dynamic. While an industrial township facilitates companies’ resource-
dependent operations with its static L-advantages, the geographical concentration of such activity 
also engenders dynamic L-advantages such as asset-augmenting activities (e.g. R&D) and 
agglomeration benefits. Given their deeply entrenched sources, these dynamic L-advantages 
cannot be easily replicated elsewhere (Markusen 1996). The location in which firms locate their 
production, organization and use of assets emerges as a critical competitive advantage.  
The roles of governments in advancing the competitiveness of a country or region within a 
country need to be altered accordingly, as created assets supersede natural factor endowments as 
a key determinant of location (Dunning 1995, 1997a). Dunning (1997b) and Stopford (1999) also 
argue that governments need to ensure that the availability, quality and cost effectiveness of 
general purpose inputs have to match up to the standards of their global competitors, as well as to 
create and sustain an institutional framework and ethos.  This is to facilitate a continuous 
upgrading of the resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction and facilitate, rather than 
impede micro-regional clusters development and upgrading. 
Singapore’s industrial township projects in Indonesia, Vietnam and China, represent 
collaborative efforts by the Singapore and respective local governments to create location-bound 
advantages within more uncertain environments, through a propitious combination of cost-
effective factors of production, efficient infrastructure and management expertise; i.e., 
supplementing natural location-specific advantages with engineered ones crafted to attract 
foreign direct investments to the parks. Our field research, therefore, tests whether this mix of 
advantages has been successful in attracting investment to the parks; and, perhaps more 
importantly, the tangibility of, and the success of said advantages in retaining said investment; in 
the face of an ever-changing economic landscape and the mixed enthusiasm of potential 
investors. 
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Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
 
Background 
The first of the industrial-park programs, Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), was launched in 1992 
as a joint-venture between Singaporean government-linked companies (GLCs) and the Salim 
Group of Indonesia. Singapore’s leading industrial infrastructure builder Jurong Town 
Corporation (JTC) and Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp 
Industries) headed the architectural, physical and managerial responsibilities of the estate. The 
Salim Group, with its close ties with senior politicians, was assured priority with regards to 
regulatory control and government permission. This delegation of duties enabled the 
management to secure top-notch placing on regulations in the host country, without 
compromising the Singaporean quintessential values of transparency, reliability and efficiency. 
Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) was conceived in line with Singapore’s prosper-
thy-neighbor policies, to heighten the development of fellow ASEAN nations.  More 
importantly, the VSIP model also served to replicate confidence in Singapore’s success in Batam 
(Indonesia), in providing another low-cost industrial enclave for Singapore-based manufacturers 
to re-distribute their operations. The idea was first mooted by the then- Vietnamese Prime-
Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singaporean then-Prime-Minister, Goh Chok Tong in 1994. 
Singapore made efforts to nurture a strong working relationship with the local authorities. The 
formation of a management board, chaired by Vice-Chairperson of the Binh Duong Province 
People’s Committee sought to dispel all perceptions that the project had been forced upon by the 
central government. The Board, with members from various ministries in the government, 
supervises the allocation of permits and licenses. VSIP is jointly established and managed by a 
Singapore business group led by SembCorp Industries, and Becamex, a Vietnamese state-owned 
enterprise in Binh Duong Province.   
Unlike BIP and VSIP, the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) project was a 
project set out to showcase the Singapore industrial development model as well as a source of 
diplomatic leverage with more populous nations. This, in turn, was intended to endorse the 
perception of Singapore’s policymakers that the city-state’s reputation for efficient and 
transparent administration could be marketed to the region. CS-SIP was set up as a joint venture 
between a consortium of Chinese and Singapore-based investors; the Chinese consortia’s then 35 
percent stake was shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly national state-owned enterprises and 
investment companies of the Suzhou city and Jiangsu province, while the Singapore 
consortium’s initial 65 percent stake was distributed amongst 24 organizations, mainly Singapore 
GLCs, and the Salim Group’ subsidiary, KMP China Investments. The two groups retained 
separate identities and responsibilities, taking up projects according to their agreed roles (SIPAC, 
1999). CS-SIP was officially launched in 1994. However, the slow progress in the initial years 
resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led consortium, which funded the land development 
and infrastructure, and also for Singaporean investors involved in peripheral projects. In June 
1999, it was announced that Singapore would transfer 30 percent ownership to the Chinese 
consortium in 2001, retaining only a 35 percent share in the project. Following this change in, for 
lack of a more descriptive term, priorities, performance in the park changed rapidly for the better, 
as we note in the following section. 
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Enclaves for Enterprise 
The archetypical industrial park, BIP, was constructed to be self-contained, with communications 
and linkages running through straight to Singapore, thereby circumventing Indonesian 
authorities. The estate includes amenities like power generators, water treatment plant, sewerage 
system, telecommunication facilities and business centres.  BIP also has its own shipping 
provider and warehouses, to cater for consignments to and from Singapore. The aim of this 
design is to emulate a manufacturing domain similar to that of Singapore’s, procuring prime 
Singaporean standard and quality in a low-income economy. BIP also engages the services of an 
employment agency to source for workers in Indonesia, mainly recruited from Java and Sumatra. 
Of the 65,000 workers in BIP, over 85% are female, aged between 18 and 22.   
BIP’s first tenants were mainly the subsidiaries of multinational corporations already 
expanding in Singapore seeking to lower costs while maintaining close proximity to their higher 
end Singapore-based operations. Cumulative investments and export value peaked at 
US$2million in 2005 and the occupancy stands at 85 in 2005. Of these, the highest concentration 
was that of Japanese companies at 39, with Singapore-owned companies a distant second at 25. 
American and European investors accounted for less than a fifth of the tenant base. There is a 
high concentration of electronics operations, and supporting operations to the electronics sector.   
Like BIP, VSIP is designed as a self-contained, self-sufficient industrial park with prepared 
land plots, and ready-built factories, offering a hassle-free, one-stop service, and Singapore-style 
management expertise and infrastructure support. To ensure strategic proximity, VSIP is located 
in Binh Duong Province, just 17km north of Ho Chin Minh City, and less than an hour’s drive 
from the international airport and seaport.  A 300,000 working population in a 15-km radius also 
provides a ready talent pool of skilled and low-cost workers.  Investors in VSIP have priority in 
employing graduates from the Vietnam-Singapore Technical Training Centre. 
VSIP’s first tenants included 3M, Sandoz, Sakata Inx, Godrej (India), Liwayway Food 
Industries, and a mix of Singapore manufacturers like ST Automotive and Star Chemicals. 
However, unlike BIP, where the concentration on electronics and other light industries ties in 
with the restructuring of Singapore’s manufacturing sector, VSIP is less selective in its tenant-
profile; the tenant-mix reflects the overpowering importance of Asian MNEs (85%), while the 
sector mix ranges from textiles, to electronics and pharmaceuticals. Singapore and Asian 
countries are represented by various sectors, while the Japanese tenants are highly concentrated 
on electronics. VSIP’s major tenants include Konica, Nitto Denko, Kimberly-Clark, Diethelm 
and Roche. VSIP has 138 committed tenants from 21 countries, of which 80 are already 
operational. 
CS-SIP was more ambitious, and controversial, as an overseas township project. Designed 
for its projected 360,000 population, the industrious project was envisaged to be a balanced 
environment with state-of-the-art urban facilities. CS-SIP was designated as the future of 
commerciality in Suzhou and the surrounding areas. The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, 
promised an administration facility that has independence from certain governmental ministries 
and investments in administrative processes (Cartier, 1995). Like the prototype-BIP, it provided 
high-quality infrastructure, pollution control, ‘one-stop’ and corruption-free operating and 
decision-making processes, minimal entry/performance regulation, transparent financial charges, 
and the delivery of social and welfare services to support an efficient and co-operative workforce 
and a work-oriented community.  
Contrary to the expectations of many pundits, investments began to pour in almost 
immediately after the transfer of ownership to the Chinese partners; by June 2001, 193 
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investment projects worth over US$5.1 billion were recorded. To-date, CS-SIP has attracted over 
1300 foreign companies and 6500 domestic companies, accounting for a cumulative contractual 
foreign investment in excess US$16 billion, and cumulative contractual domestic investment of 
RMB30 billion, with 75000 jobs created. CS-SIP, named as one of the ‘next frontier tech cities’ 
of the world by Newsweek, has established its position as an investment hub for Fortune 500 
companies. Over 75 percent of the investments are in electronics, information technology and 
other high-tech segments. The next phases for construction of transportation networks and other 
infrastructure developments are at an estimated cost of US$10billion. CSSD plans to list in 
China, and possibly, Singapore, within the next 1-2 years. 
 
 
Field Research 
Analysis of the Singapore-styled parks, relying primarily on secondary data from official 
publications and press reports, is not enough to ascertain the situation on the ground. To obtain 
primary data from the tenants of parks, we applied the questionnaire developed in Yeoh et al 
(2000), and surveyed the case-study parks on the differential impact of various pull factors on 
firms’ investment decisions, along with the differential impact of different types of constraints on 
their operations. 
 
Methodology: Questionnaire Survey 
The questionnaire was designed as a comparative study to investigate the various factors 
influencing firms' investment decisions, along with the problems faced by their operations; 
specifically, to test tenants’ perception of the created variables meant to give the parks an 
advantage, as mentioned earlier in this paper, as well as measure said past perception against the 
current reality. The question sets for the tenants in the three industrial parks are similar. The 
surveys sought to highlight the different push/pull factors facing the park tenants when they 
chose to relocate their operations in the respective parks, and the operating constraints faced by 
the respective park tenants. The survey focused on three main areas. Firstly, the basic profile of 
the respondent: type of ownership, nature of operations, number of employees, sales turnover 
and its market orientation. Secondly, the factors that attracted the respondents to invest in the 
park. Data on various constraints was gathered in the third section.  
Questionnaire surveys were conducted in Indonesia, Vietnam and China from December 
2003 to May 2005. A total of 232 responses were collected from tenant-firms: of these, 52 were 
located in BIP, 48 were located in VSIP and the remaining in 132 in CS-SIP. In all cases, the 
surveyed tenants were carefully selected so as to obtain a representative distribution of all tenants 
in the park across both industry and nature of operations; to illustrate this distribution, the 
respondents were further reclassified in terms of type of ownership, nature of their operations, 
number of employees, and target markets. The surveys were conducted through face-to-face 
interviews in the case-study parks lasting an average of 45minutes, with staff in senior 
managerial positions or above present in all cases, to ensure the response of the selected tenants, 
and the holistic and accurate nature of the obtained responses. 
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Statistical Analysis:  Logit Estimations 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses relating to 
factors and constraints, a logit model2 was applied to compare the perceived advantages 
influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the case-study parks. A similar model was also 
applied to the constraints faced by the tenants in these parks. The logit estimations are set out in 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
 
Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decision to Locate in the Case-Study Parks  
 
(Table 1) 
 
Of the many supposed created advantages brought to the table by the Singapore connection, the 
two most emphasized in both advertising and academic literature have been the ‘Singapore 
system’, i.e. the ‘exported’ infrastructure and managerial expertise, and the ‘Singapore 
commitment’, or more simply, the political affiliation engendered by the combination of the 
involvement of two co-operating states, and of the managing government-linked corporations. 
Considering the advantages of the latter trumpeted by the involved parties, then, perceptions 
across the three parks proved, much as in our previous reports, surprisingly mild; only in BIP 
was political commitment (of both the Singapore and host governments) perceived to any 
statistically significant degree, and in VSIP political commitment seemed all but a non-issue. 
One interesting trend, however, is easily noticeable in both BIP and CS-SIP; Singapore-owned 
respondents in both parks placed relatively more emphasis on the political commitment of the 
Singapore government (to a significant degree in BIP, as evidenced by the statistically significant 
α1 = 1.7842), while joint-venture companies, in contrast, thought of the political commitment of 
the host government as a more pertinent issue (again, to a significant degree in BIP, as evidenced 
by the statistically significant α2 = 2.1447) – a disparity of opinion possibly, but not totally, 
attributable to home bias, many of the joint ventures being partially Singapore-owned 
themselves. 
                                                          
2
 The logit model involves a binary choice of the ith firm which can be represented by a random variable, Zi, which takes the value of 1 if a 
certain choice is made and the value 0 if that choice is not made. The (cumulative) logistic distribution function, estimated by the maximum 
likelihood, takes the following form: 
Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 where: Pi is the probability of firm i choosing the factor in question; exp refers to the exponentiation operator and Zi is a linear function of the 
firm attributes, defined as   
Zi = α0 + α1S + α2J + α3P+ α4M 
where: S = 1 if wholly Singapore-owned, 0 otherwise; J = 1 if established via Joint-Venture, 0 otherwise; P = 1 if producing intermediate 
products, 0 otherwise; M = 1 if producing industrial services, 0 otherwise; α0 = constant term; and αi = coefficient of independent 
(explanatory) variable. 
Hence, if the estimated coefficients in the logit model is statistically significant (as indicated by the z- statistics and p-values, this would imply 
that the probability of a firm (e.g. foreign-owned) choosing a particular factor is greater than the probability of another firm (of different 
ownership type) making the choice, after taking into consideration the types of goods and services produced. 
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The other half of the Singapore equation, too, returned rather interestingly mixed figures. 
Joint ventures in BIP gave the snub to the presence of infrastructure facilities and support 
services, with a significant and negative α2 (= -2.6465), while other demographics across the 
parks returned statistically insignificant but often negative responses. One of the greatest 
perceived advantages of Singapore-styled infrastructure, its reliability, returned no significant 
responses at all; tenant firms, it seems, were rather indifferent to this particular created 
advantage. The formulaic one-stop service, on the other hand, garnered more positive responses, 
with positive and significant results from smaller firms in BIP and firms engaged in capital good 
production in CS-SIP, perhaps due to the nature of the industries these firms are involved in – we 
note that firms engaged in capital good production returned positive responses across all three 
parks, and many firms with few employees in BIP are engaged in highly automated production 
processes, which would necessarily rely heavily on efficient and convenient infrastructural 
facilities. However, at the same time, smaller firms in CS-SIP were instead less likely to consider 
this as an advantage drawing them to locate in the park, from the statistically significant and 
negative α11 (= -1.0551); while respondent profiles partially explain this, as smaller firms in CS-
SIP tend to be more involved in mid- to high-level production and services which tend to require 
more specialized services, it does not provide a total explanation for this curious result. 
Nonetheless, the conclusion can be drawn that infrastructural advantages seem to not quite have 
lived up to their name – insofar as providing ‘advantages’ over the competition. 
More practical considerations, in contrast, ruled the roost. Firms engaged in capital good 
production in CS-SIP found industrial relations a pertinent factor, from the positive and 
significant α10 (= 1.3184). Access to overseas markets proved to be a non-factor, but access to 
domestic markets were apparently perceived to be invaluable by smaller firms in both CS-SIP 
and VSIP, signalling a distinct market focus on the part of these smaller companies; whereas 
firms of all sizes, and those engaged in capital good production in particular, all returned positive 
and significant results for preferential access to target markets, reflecting, in all likelihood, the 
continuing attractiveness of the growing Chinese market. Labour issues proved probably the 
most significant of all; availability of labour was a highly significant advantage for both smaller 
firms in BIP and Singapore-owned firms in CS-SIP, whereas competitive labour costs seemed to 
be a recurring factor for Singapore-owned firms, with positive and significant results (α7 (= 
1.0166) and α13 (= 2.4222), respectively) returned for these firms in both CS-SIP and VSIP – 
implying, perhaps, a certain preoccupation on the part of Singapore companies with ‘cheap 
labour’, born possibly out of rising labour costs in Singapore, and contingent with the ostensible 
aims of the city-state’s regionalization programme. Clearly, too, a certain perception of cheap 
labour in China and Vietnam subsisted among these firms at the time of their entry; the veracity 
of this perception, however, would prove to be of especial significance to Singapore companies 
in CS-SIP, which were relatively less likely to have chosen a location based on availability of 
skilled labour, as shown by the negative and signficant α7 (= -1.0928). Such firms, it seems, may 
well have intended to utilize either only unskilled labour, or else to import skilled labour from 
other countries, most likely their own; signifying, in all possibility, a less than positive 
perception of Chinese skilled labour at the time of entry – something which may seem, in 
hindsight, a rather curious perception, given the track record of China’s business and industrial 
professionals in recent years. 
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Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations  
 
(Table 2) 
 
While perhaps less the case now, though, such perceptions may well have been at least partially 
justified, from the large number of significant results returned for labour-related issues by 
respondents in CS-SIP; firms engaged in the production of capital goods suffered relatively more 
from a shortage of skilled labour, but relatively less from a shortage of professionals and 
managers, perhaps owing to the specific labour requirements of the industries these firms are 
engaged in. Joint ventures in CS-SIP were, instead, the ones to suffer a shortage of professionals 
and managers, whereas, their Singapore-owned counterparts experienced relatively more 
problems with low labour productivity instead. The possible signals, then, are twofold – firstly, 
that while rapidly improving, Chinese professionals may not yet be up to the standard required 
by tenant firms in CS-SIP; and secondly, more simply, that perceptions of a vast pool of labour 
to be tapped (that horde of job-stealing faces politicians in certain quarters love to hate) were, to 
say the least, overblown. The reality, in all likelihood, lies somewhere between the two; while it 
certainly seems to be true, from our previous studies, that Chinese labour is not as plentiful as 
initially imagined, it is also true that our interviews often produced accounts of having to train 
local labour from scratch – often, perhaps unsurprisingly, from firms engaged in more 
specialized industries. Singapore firms in CS-SIP, instead, had other problems to deal with; the 
only demographic to return positive and significant figures for impact of government regulations 
and lack of transparency and/or frequent changes in host regulations – and, indeed, the only 
demographic in CS-SIP to return positive figures at all – it is exceedingly obvious that Singapore 
companies, rightly or not, seem to generally feel rather hard done by local Chinese authorities. 
Partially due to complexities between the central and local authorities in China, it nonetheless 
remains an inescapable fact that political commitment, in this case, seems to have created little to 
no real advantage for firms in CS-SIP. 
Tenant firms in BIP, on the other hand, experienced a different brand of trouble; joint venture 
firms (ß2 =2.0163) and larger firms (ß6 =1.7049) both listed industrial relations problems as 
among the main hindrances to their operations, pointing to, possibly, a certain cultural disconnect 
between larger firms in BIP and other interested parties, such as local authorities and workers’ 
groups – larger firms in particular as, we note, Singapore-owned firms in BIP also seem to 
encounter this problem fairly frequently, though not quite to a statistically significant degree. 
The exact reason for this is, unfortunately, unclear from our interviews; however, given the 
rather rapid changes in political allegiance in Indonesia since BIP’s inception, the possibility 
comes to mind that the issue at hand may well less be an issue of unfriendly industrial relations, 
than industrial relations not as friendly as expected. 
In terms of more economic constraints, the endemic problem of high and rising costs alluded 
to in our previous papers on this subject shows itself again, with nearly all demographics 
returning positive results for this constraint; as time goes on, however, tenant firms seem to have, 
if not solved, then grown used to the problem – not a single demographic identified it as a main 
constraint, as shown by the lack of significant results. Difficulty in securing funds for expansion, 
too, seemed to not be a problem – although this, we note, is quite possibly due to limited plans 
for expansion in the first place. Instead, the issue of competition from overseas competitors 
proved the main point of contention, with some demographics identifying it as a main constraint 
and others not finding it a problem at all. Some of the results were rather curious; large firms in 
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BIP, the same which complained of frequent industrial relations problems, found overseas 
competition not a problem at all, from the negative and highly significant ß6 (=-2.8123), as did 
producers of capital goods in CS-SIP, which, from their positive results for access to the 
domestic market (corresponding with their negative results for access to overseas markets) and 
their positive and significant results for preferential access to target markets, are almost certainly 
selling to the Chinese market – which should, in all probability, result in them facing intense 
competition from overseas competitors. The former would seem to support the aforementioned 
theory of ‘industrial relations problems’ that are less real problems than the lack of, for lack of a 
better term, overly friendly relations; while the latter, with reference to practical economics, may 
not be as surprising as all – local is best, after all, when it tends to be generally cheaper. Less 
surprising results include producers of intermediate products in BIP and Singapore-owned 
companies in CS-SIP finding overseas competition relatively more troublesome; the former is 
almost a given, with intermediate products being largely sold overseas and with only a limited 
domestic market in Indonesia to ameliorate the problem (although we find that producers of the 
same in VSIP, though ostensibly in much the same circumstances, seem to suffer less from this 
problem) whereas the latter is most likely a result of the limits on the ability of wholly 
Singapore-owned companies to establish themselves in the same way partially-Chinese 
companies can; the same limits faced, most probably, by most other overseas competitors. 
Singapore companies, it seems, garner no favouritism, even in a Singapore-styled industrial park. 
In some cases, local really is best. 
 
Issues and Challenges 
Investment enclaves or ‘shaded places’ attract foreign direct investment (Lundan 2003), and 
Peck (1996) suggests that these investment clusters form in and around centers of international 
infrastructure. The Singapore-developed parks sought to capitalize on this by combining superior 
infrastructure with a range of exclusive investment concessions acquired via negotiations with 
the various stakeholders in the host countries, acquiring a host of (at least initially) mostly 
unprecedented and exclusive privileges that provided a competitive advantage over competing 
locations. For example, the parks were permitted to build and run their own on-site power and 
water treatment plants as well as telecommunications facilities; the result being that these parks 
enjoyed reliable infrastructural facilities in locales where water cut offs and electricity blackouts 
were common. Furthermore, the parks’ management boards more often than not included 
government officials from the host country. This arrangement was to facilitate the parks’ 
privileged access to investment approvals, endorsements for construction activities as well as 
immigration-related permissions and import/export permits. This synergistic combination of 
factors rendered the parks self-sufficient and capable of offering investors the formulaic one-stop 
service that the Singapore-styled infrastructure is reputed for; services otherwise atypical in 
emerging economies beset with administrative uncertainties. In addition, the parks would 
supposedly attain credibility through their inherent association with Singapore, which has 
enjoyed a positive reputation with various multinational corporations for its stable, corruption-
free business ethos.  Furthermore, strategic alliances between Singapore’s own state enterprise 
networks and its counterparts in these regional sites were critical in mobilizing the financial 
resources to complete these multi-million projects.  In most cases, these were achieved within a 
relatively short time frame of 18 to 24 months.  
Our empirical findings ascertain that the investment-friendly institutional framework as laid 
by the Singapore and host governments, plus factor availability and, in the case of CS-SIP, the 
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perception of more conducive industrial relations, have been instrumental in engendering a 
competitive environment within the townships. Tenants within these parks have reaped 
significant advantages through tapping on the low-cost competitive environments, on top of 
relying on Singapore’s infrastructure, management and expertise. It should also be noted that 
Singapore’s reputation with multinational corporations was, in fact, perceived to lend a measure 
of credibility; some firms, in our interviews, pointed to this as a significant factor in their 
decision to locate within their respective parks.  
Nonetheless, even the strategically engineered inter-government endorsement of the flagship 
projects, plus the huge amount of resources mobilized through these strategic partnerships, have 
failed to shield the parks from a gamut of all too practical problems; and that, in certain cases, 
these state linkages may have even failed to eliminate, and even engendered, political pressures 
on these supposedly politically-blessed enterprises. The following observations update, and offer 
new insights, on recent developments in these industrial-township projects.  
 
Economics of Market Competition 
Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are facing mounting competition from competing parks in 
their vicinities. Competitor parks, some with strong political patronage, have burgeoned around 
BIP; for instance, Panbil Industrial Park is located just beside BIP and boasts facilities 
comparable to the Singaporean-developed township. Also, many of these competitor parks are 
able to offer more attractive rates than BIP.  Cost-conscious tenants facing rising labour and 
material costs in BIP may be tempted to relocate their operations, as stated by several firms 
during our on-site interviews.  Likewise, VSIP’s attractiveness has been eroded by competition 
from newer industrial estates such as the Linh Trung Export Processing Zone, on top of 
incumbent parks such as the Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone. Established by experienced and 
street-savvy developers from Taiwan, China and Thailand, these competitor parks market 
themselves aggressively on price, charging lower transportation fees accruing from more 
strategic locations.   
SIP, likewise, has not spared the intense competition arising from the adjacent Suzhou New 
District as local officials have chosen to market the latter over SIP.  Such competition has 
somewhat subsided after control over SIP was handed over to the Chinese partners, when the 
interests of the Singapore and local stakeholders came into somewhat better alignment. 
Nevertheless, SIP continues to face competition from the nearby Pudong New Area and China’s 
five special economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan. These industrial 
centers are part of China’s larger strategy to attract foreign investments and thus share similar 
privileges and political status with SIP.  In recent years, these locations have upgraded their 
industrial structure and innovated on their management systems, rendering themselves 
increasingly competitive vis-à-vis SIP. The simple economics of competition have marginalized 
the premium attached to the ‘superior infrastructure’ which was the selling point in all of 
Singapore’s industrial-investment enclaves.  Moreover, all of these parks’ supposedly exclusive 
investments incentives will, in all likelihood, prove no more than a temporary advantage over the 
rapidly improving competition. 
 
Vagaries of Political ‘Allegiances’  
The ‘institutional’ framework of the flagship projects in Indonesia, Vietnam and China rested 
heavily on personal ties.  Over time, these have declined due to various political and social 
factors stemming from the host environments (Yeoh et al, 2005).  In the BIP project, the reliance 
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on the Salim Group was necessary due to the context of ‘crony capitalism’ the Indonesian system 
fostered by then-President Soeharto; Salim’s political and commercial influence has, however, 
waned in the post-Soeharto era. As well, inter-governmental endorsements no longer suffice to 
secure commitments at the lower tiers of government. Anecdotal evidence from on-site 
interviews suggests a more complex regulatory environment and increased bureaucracy for 
foreign investors. Tenants now have to deal with provincial governments on top of the sub-
provincial or district authorities. BIP’s reputation as an investment enclave has also been 
weakened by political developments in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the September 11 
attacks in the United States, the Bali-Jakarta bomb blasts and negative press reports on active 
terrorist cells within the region. In recent years, Indonesia has experienced a greater degree of 
stability, but the climate remains far from ideal – especially as, in the midst of continuing 
economic uncertainty, the Indonesian administration has recently concluded negotiations with 
Singapore to tap into the city-state’s expertise to further develop Indoneisan industrial parks in 
the same vein as BIP. 
In Vietnam, investments in VSIP were expected, in situ, to benefit from Singapore’s ability 
to secure special concessions. These initial expectations now seem roseate, as inter-government 
endorsement (in the spirit of ASEAN economic co-operation) has proved insufficient to secure 
similar commitment in the lower tiers of government. In VSIP, the influence of local 
administrators, and their interests in competing developments, has compromised the significance 
of inter-governmental endorsement of the project. The ‘special’ support from the local 
authorities has proved to be less significant than envisioned.  Improvements on infrastructural 
projects have translated into a plethora of miscellaneous fee, and added to operating costs - 
doubtless a far cry from the aid envisioned by majority of tenants who were attracted by the 
Vietnamese government’s perceived political commitment to the project, who now rate 
government regulation as one of their greatest constraints vis-à-vis CS-SIP. Our on-site 
interviews further reveal negative undercurrents over Singapore’s control and management of 
VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that tensions have arisen over the Singapore-styled 
management practices, and these have materialized in perception differences, protracted conflicts 
and project delays.  Although it has not blown into a major issue, it is without a doubt a growing 
one. Local sentiments towards the Singapore seem to mirror those expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi 
experience in China, albeit to a lesser degree. Significantly, SembCorp Industries has announced 
plans to divest itself of part of its stake in VSIP to reflect a better ‘alignment of interests’, even 
as the project is finally registering positive returns on its investment (Yeoh and Wong 2006). 
In China, SIP’s progress was initially hampered by an approach that was unsuited to the local 
administrative context.  Although the project was endorsed by senior politicians both in China 
and Singapore, this did not automatically translate into cooperation at the lower tiers of 
government. Instead, local authorities chose to promote the existing Suzhou New District, 
arguably on the basis that they had greater ownership in this development as opposed to SIP, 
which Singapore controlled. Since 2001, this misalignment of interests has been rectified by the 
handover of control to the Chinese, and the appointment of key officials previously steering 
Suzhou New District to leadership positions in CS-SIP.  The park’s managing board is currently 
jointly headed by Chinese Vice-Premier Madam Wu Yi and Singapore’s Prime Minster Mr Lee 
Hsien Loong.  Such realignment of interests has, at face value, resolved the ‘paradox of context’ 
(Pereira 2003), which encumbered the SIP initiative. However, SIP yet shares the political 
patronage of the Chinese officials with many of its competitors (Yeoh et al 2005). 
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Conclusion 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period of time indicates 
the ability of the Singapore’s state enterprise network to mobilize economic and political 
resources to create economic space to maintain her economic competitiveness. These projects 
have obtained special investment conditions within their overseas localities, with government 
endorsements that further underscoring its significance. Our previous reports on the subject, 
however, have shown that the economics of competition will not be ignored, nor have the parks’ 
political patronage been sufficient to shelter them from socio-political complexities unique to the 
individual environments; our latest results corroborate these, and further imply that, while the 
parks (and their tenants) are beginning to adjust to economic realities, the dynamic nature of the 
socio-political environment continues to present additional challenges to park managers. 
In Indonesia, the case of BIP has been a measured success, judging from its current level of 
foreign investment; too, it has indeed accomplished the Singapore government’s initial mission 
of developing an investment enclave utilizing Singapore-styled administrative and infrastructural 
constructs.  These initial goals aside, however, the way forward remains unclear for the park, 
despite the recent relative political stability in Indonesia; investment momentum remains 
sluggish, as the endemic problem of increasing competition (both for foreign investments, and 
from foreign competitors) is further complicated by additional socio-political disharmonies.  
Given the nature of industries in BIP, and their large initial investment and infrastructure outlays, 
it continues to be unlikely that investors, in the short run, will pull out and relocate their 
operations; at the same time, however, it becomes increasingly certain that the long-term will 
depend on the ability of both tenant firms and park administrators to work through socio-political 
issues that arise. 
In Vietnam, the additional agenda vis-à-vis CS-SIP was that the host nation is a fellow 
member of ASEAN, and promoting economic development in VSIP was one prong of 
Singapore’s prosper-thy-neighbor policies. This is apparent from the mix of ‘targeted’ industries, 
as well as the park’s management style and operations. In recent years, as previously noted, the 
park’s performance has taken a positive turn, and our results show, similarly, a distinct lack of 
particular issues with which VSIP tenants find a hindrance to their operations; however, endemic 
issues such as rising overhead costs yet subsist, and together with competition from industrial 
parks overseas, are placing growing pressure on the park and its tenants. The park remains 
viable, but unspectacular; it is telling that our results show few significant results at all, whether 
with regard to pertinent constraints, or in favour of the park’s advantages. At the current time, 
however, VSIP remains relatively free of socio-political complications, and economically yet 
maintains a respectable degree of competitiveness. 
In China, CS-SIP was, given current literature, almost certainly a strategic thrust by the 
Singapore government to capitalize upon first-mover advantages in a regional economy with 
immense market potential; as well as to both enhance Singapore’s reputation for infrastructural 
efficiency, and leverage the foray of Singapore companies into China’s infrastructure plans and 
commercial-residential township projects. Following the handover to the Chinese partners, CS-
SIP has indeed been doing very well for itself, as can be seen both from its economic results, and 
from the upbeat tone of the respondents from the park. However, several labour issues remain to 
be resolved such as the endemic ‘Singapore-symptomatic’ problem of rising overhead costs as 
well as keen competition from domestic parks; minor issues that might as yet balloon into major 
ones as more and more global entrants seek to tap on China’s enormous domestic potential, 
much as CS-SIP is doing. CS-SIP, however, is adjusting to these familiar problems; it is other 
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issues, such as continuing disparities of expectations, and the reality, of labour in China, as well 
as what appears to be unresolved issues with local authorities, that seem poised to plague the 
park for the near future. That these issues should once again arise is indeed worrying; especially 
as, in other empirical results not included due to a dearth of data from VSIP, joint venture firms 
in CS-SIP chose, as their top two strategies for the future, the adoption of new technologies, and 
relocation to other local parks. 
In summary, our findings in this paper largely reinforce our previous conclusions; that while 
the underlying theories for Singapore’s regionalization stratagem and, pari passu, the strategic 
advantage created for firms within these industrial-townships have revealed undoubtedly tangible 
and remarkable results, these industrial parks nonetheless remain at risk from the socio-political 
contexts and administrative complexities that stem from the various host environments – even as, 
the current figures suggest, the parks adjust to economic and competitive realities. This paper, 
indeed, contends that while an interesting concept, the idea of porting an entire management 
system and infrastructure to other countries was overly optimistic in the first, and further failed 
to take into account certain realities inherent in the regionalization process. The parks, while 
having each evolved into a respectable entity on their own, are now feeling the effects of this 
overenthusiasm; and while dealing quite admirably with the economic aspect (or, perhaps, 
simply growing used to the challenges presented), continue to reel from the shifting currents of 
their individual socio-political environments – continuing to be, it seems, despite various 
measures and realignments, strangers in a strange land. 
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Table 1: Factors Influencing Firm's Decision to Invest in the Park           
                 
 Batamindo Industrial Park China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Vietnam Singapore Industrial Park
 Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Firm Size Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Firm Size Type of Ownership Nature of Operations 
 
Singapore 
Owned 
Joint  
Venture 
Intermediate 
Products 
Capital 
Goods 
Less 
than 
100 
More 
than 
500 
Singapore 
Owned 
Joint  
Venture 
Intermediate 
Products 
Capital 
Goods 
Less 
than 
100 
More 
than 
500 
Singapore 
Owned 
Joint  
Venture 
Intermediate 
Products 
Capital 
Goods 
Industrial Relations NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.6594 0.1721 -0.4302 1.3184 1.4784 -30.2542 -0.2717 -33.7128 0.3408 39.5129
  NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.3213 0.8441 0.5965 0.0650 0.1695 1.0000 0.8301 1.0000 0.7584 1.0000
Infrastructure Facilities  
and Support Services -0.9947 -2.6465 -0.3981 36.5311 1.9602 0.3318 -0.3557 -0.0423 0.0479 -0.0625 -0.5085 -0.1870 0.6466 -37.5508 -0.2696 36.2199
  0.2430 0.0531 0.6088 1.0000 0.1717 0.6784 0.4502 0.9438 0.9156 0.9175 0.2986 0.8574 0.4915 1.0000 0.7342 1.0000
Preferentail Access to  
Target Markets NA NA NA NA NA NA -1.0468 0.2169 -0.1352 1.1208 1.9287 2.9494 0.3675 -32.8352 0.0511 -33.0997
  NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.1890 0.7506 0.8208 0.0952 0.0719 0.0401 0.7192 1.0000 0.9611 1.0000
Availability of Labour -0.2350 -2.0462 1.4886 1.0995 2.6090 0.0220 1.2369 -0.2142 0.3287 0.6934 -0.4618 -0.6652 2.3019 38.9914 1.3517 -37.1814
  0.7967 0.1059 0.1045 0.5156 0.0962 0.9794 0.0142 0.7945 0.5427 0.3053 0.3896 0.6067 0.0237 1.0000 0.1826 1.0000
Political Commitment  
from Host Government 0.7548 2.1447 0.3261 0.7537 -1.7198 -0.0550 -0.1081 0.7865 -0.6302 -0.9574 -0.5894 -0.1244 -1.5685 -32.1779 0.4117 -31.1729
  0.3393 0.0204 0.6504 0.6282 0.2197 0.9406 0.8204 0.2302 0.1682 0.1254 0.2378 0.9076 0.1848 1.0000 0.5995 1.0000
Political Commitment  
from Singapore 1.7842 1.0603 0.2776 -33.6582 0.6146 0.4165 0.4702 -31.9179 0.5010 0.3394 -0.2149 2.0444 NA NA NA NA 
  0.0300 0.1905 0.7129 1.0000 0.6155 0.5863 0.5369 1.0000 0.5160 0.7668 0.7998 0.1218 NA NA NA NA 
Reliable Infrastructure  
in Industrial Estate -0.0234 36.1442 0.3806 -37.0336 -1.0012 0.1925 -0.2110 -0.8217 0.6856 0.4617 0.0406 -0.2543 -0.3802 -0.4067 0.0247 41.6772
  0.9784 1.0000 0.6543 1.0000 0.5288 0.8279 0.6637 0.1766 0.1718 0.4770 0.9350 0.8135 0.6465 0.7872 0.9756 1.0000
Competitive Labour  
Costs 0.6168 0.0374 -0.8197 56.3143 57.1262 0.9195 1.0166 0.4666 0.4415 0.4395 -0.2983 0.2038 2.4222 37.1093 0.5672 -36.1837
  0.6106 0.9694 0.4142 1.0000 1.0000 0.3008 0.0402 0.4792 0.3754 0.5074 0.5702 0.8500 0.0149 1.0000 0.4853 1.0000
Availability of Skilled  
and Educated Labour 0.5101 1.1072 -0.9988 1.0780 0.1423 0.4901 -1.0928 0.0709 -0.4587 0.0757 0.5657 -0.7189 -1.4652 -33.3104 -0.7912 -31.2732
  0.5192 0.1612 0.1542 0.5006 0.9059 0.5158 0.0376 0.9072 0.3283 0.9011 0.2567 0.5634 0.2166 1.0000 0.4178 1.0000
One Stop Service  
Provided by Industrial  
Estate -0.1736 -1.8497 0.0565 35.7936 2.5401 0.7141 0.5304 0.0852 -0.2486 1.0954 -1.0551 0.2760 -0.1331 -0.0228 -0.1836 72.4484
  0.8441 0.1739 0.9470 1.0000 0.0818 0.4424 0.2762 0.8939 0.6139 0.0809 0.0320 0.7914 0.8723 0.9880 0.8149 1.0000
Access to Overseas  
Market -1.1587 1.2186 -0.2886 0.1825 -34.8907 0.6356 0.2133 0.4188 0.4667 -0.1869 -0.8172 -1.3085 -1.5073 -36.1173 0.7809 -32.8642
  0.1818 0.1888 0.7005 0.9061 1.0000 0.3971 0.6833 0.5253 0.3403 0.7937 0.1010 0.2877 0.2174 1.0000 0.3727 1.0000
Access to Domestic  
Market NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.3378 -0.2551 0.1104 0.8291 0.8033 1.5148 0.8612 0.0455 -0.7684 36.9905
  NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.5112 0.6836 0.8164 0.2420 0.0977 0.2158 0.3396 0.9762 0.3625 1.0000
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Table 2: Constraints Faced by the Firms in their Respective Parks           
           
 
     
 Batamindo Industrial Park China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Vietnam Singapore Industrial Park
 Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Firm Size Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Firm Size Type of Ownership Nature of Operations 
 
Singapore 
Owned 
Joint  
Venture 
Intermediate 
Products 
Capital 
Goods 
Less 
than 
100 
More 
than 
500 
Singapore 
Owned 
Joint  
Venture 
Intermediate 
Products 
Capital 
Goods 
Less 
than 
100 
More 
than 
500 
Singapore 
Owned 
Joint  
Venture 
Intermediate 
Products 
Capital 
Goods 
Shortage of Skilled  
and Educated Labour NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.4819 -0.2269 0.4924 1.0400 0.1844 0.7867 -0.9959 -0.1880 0.3712 49.1152
  NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.3116 0.7162 0.2762 0.0924 0.7064 0.4554 0.2405 0.8994 0.6416 1.0000
Shortage Professionals  
and Managers -1.1121 -0.4394 0.3720 -33.9973 -33.4095 0.2998 0.5756 1.2733 -0.7252 -1.5260 -0.0209 1.0244 -0.6011 34.3768 -0.8053 -35.1185
  0.2337 0.5989 0.6405 1.0000 1.0000 0.6906 0.2322 0.0491 0.1476 0.0639 0.9675 0.3501 0.5228 1.0000 0.3684 1.0000
Low Labour  
Productivity 1.1222 0.7227 0.0409 0.9687 0.3341 0.0018 1.1165 0.8640 -0.7561 0.8597 1.3499 2.0327 -0.9402 1.1850 -0.4268 37.1318
  0.1477 0.3544 0.9525 0.5323 0.7744 0.9981 0.0791 0.2627 0.3689 0.2627 0.2092 0.2043 0.4308 0.4366 0.6639 1.0000
Industrial Relations  
Problems 0.9232 2.0163 -0.6300 1.7889 -0.9293 1.7049 NA NA NA NA NA NA -33.2046 -33.9560 1.5301 72.7864
  0.2732 0.0285 0.4068 0.2706 0.5101 0.0431 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1.0000 1.0000 0.2153 1.0000
Lack of Good  
Supporting Services 0.5841 0.4938 -0.2265 -34.4220 -0.7583 0.7158 0.1876 -0.3768 -0.3106 -0.4497 0.2351 -0.2690 NA NA NA NA 
  0.4504 0.5257 0.7476 1.0000 0.5557 0.3166 0.7052 0.5910 0.5362 0.5209 0.6562 0.8287 NA NA NA NA 
Difficulty in Securing  
Funds for Expansion 0.6078 0.4639 -1.4096 -30.4823 0.6040 1.0263 0.0540 -0.1960 -0.7118 -1.8227 0.3967 -31.6347 -33.0137 2.9967 1.7151 1.1809
  0.5405 0.6667 0.1369 1.0000 0.6733 0.3306 0.9178 0.7864 0.1963 0.0877 0.4823 1.0000 1.0000 0.1265 0.2359 1.0000
High/rising Overhead  
Costs 0.7628 0.2734 0.0828 37.4481 0.2350 0.2314 0.7347 0.3146 0.5494 0.5186 0.3440 1.6284 NA NA NA NA 
  0.4053 0.7432 0.9147 1.0000 0.8576 0.7633 0.1308 0.6052 0.2320 0.3927 0.4803 0.1859 NA NA NA NA 
Impact of Government  
Regulations 0.1481 -0.4773 -0.8136 34.6664 0.3478 0.9992 0.8890 -33.3590 -0.1577 -1.0264 -0.8994 -0.4533 NA NA NA NA 
  0.8578 0.6142 0.3022 1.0000 0.7969 0.2422 0.0925 1.0000 0.7946 0.3507 0.1057 0.7297 NA NA NA NA 
Competition from  
Overseas Competitors -0.4500 -1.5019 1.7619 32.1729 -1.1477 -2.8123 1.2311 -0.0791 0.7085 -1.3154 0.0305 -0.1618 -0.4061 0.0363 1.0908 33.0668
  0.6813 0.1540 0.0934 1.0000 0.4887 0.0435 0.0272 0.8981 0.1465 0.0616 0.9520 0.8817 0.6378 0.9805 0.1816 1.0000
Lack of Transparency/ 
Frequent Changes in 
Host  
Regulations 1.4456 0.9162 0.4550 -1.0462 -1.7501 0.1826 1.1383 -0.0754 -0.1529 -32.2727 -0.4943 -32.7282 NA NA NA NA 
  0.2297 0.3940 0.5962 0.5128 0.1803 0.8443 0.0588 0.9461 0.8273 1.0000 0.4542 1.0000 NA NA NA NA 
       
 
         
       
 
         
 
